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STRATEGIC CULTURE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO NAVAL STRATEGY
Roger W. Barnett
At the Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum in June 2006, the Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, called for the creation of a new
maritime strategy. The key for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in for-
mulating a new strategy will be in describing how, within the context of a national
military strategy, maritime forces can make a strategic difference. There are three
parts to this requirement. First, it should be cast as a strategy. Secondly, it should
be closely aligned with national military strategy, for, as Samuel Huntington
sagely observed over fifty years ago,
The resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function
of the public support of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop this
necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which
clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.1
And, thirdly, the strategy must be in harmony with Navy strategic culture.
When the Navy’s Cold War maritime strategy was crafted in the early 1980s, it
fulfilled each of these three requirements.2 It was a strategy because it had strategic
context: it addressed a specific adversary in specific
geographic places along a phased transition in time. It
was not doctrine, which tends to be essentially context
free. It was complementary to the national, and NATO,
strategy of flexible response, and it offered a way to em-
ploy naval forces (including allied naval forces) in order
to take the war to the Soviets in places, against targets,
and at times of our own choosing, not theirs. The ques-
tion the crafters of the strategy asked themselves was:
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How can naval forces employ the dimensions of warfare—time, geographic space,
and intensity—to influence the course and outcome of the war?
The maritime strategy of the 1980s was successful in underwriting plans and
programs, actions with U.S. allies, and peacetime deployment patterns and exer-
cises. It was opposed by many in the Department of Defense, other military ser-
vices, American civilian strategists, and, to be sure, the Soviet military. It was
characterized as too risky, too dangerous, too provocative, too offensive, periph-
eral to the central conflict, wasteful of resources in a sideshow, mere justification
for programs, too rigid, too independent, not specific enough for programming
purposes, not detailed enough to use for operational planning, and contrary
to—in fact, hostile to—the objectives of naval arms control. The fact that it
raised such a panoply of objections was a tribute to its power. Critics had visions
of mindless maritime martinets marching mechanically to Murmansk.3 The
strategy was, however, embraced by the naval service and, with the leadership of
a very activist Secretary of the Navy and a generous defense budget, supported
an expansion toward force-level goals of fifteen carrier battle groups, six hun-
dred combatant ships, and a robust amphibious lift capacity.
In large measure, it was looked upon favorably by the naval community
because it was in harmony with Navy strategic culture. Accordingly, if a new
strategy is to be successful, it also must resonate with Navy strategic culture.
The major, enduring characteristics of this culture, or community of shared
beliefs and attitudes, are:
• Recognizing the primacy of context
• Maintaining a systems approach
• Performing in an expeditionary manner: offensive, forward, mobile,
and joint
• Ensuring adaptability
• Accounting for inherent uncertainty and risk.
These characteristics are specific, yet they are broad enough to encompass the
Navy’s tripartite organizational culture of surface, subsurface, and air
communities. It would appear, moreover, that the Marine Corps, with some
augmentation by its unique cultural factors, can fit comfortably within this
framework.
CONTEXT
The environment influences very powerfully both how naval forces can operate
and how they do operate. The thought patterns of seafarers are powerfully
molded by the essentially featureless, politically uncontrolled seascape. Both the
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open ocean and the littoral are environments hostile to sailors. The environment
must be mastered and kept under control first; then attention can be directed to-
ward strategic objectives.4
The maritime environment is fundamentally nonlinear. That is, no natural or
artificial lines exist around which to organize reconnaissance, surveillance, or
battle. There are no flanks, no forward edge of the battle area, and no rear.
Missions can be executed simultaneously or sequentially. The senses operate
differently and have different priorities. There is no role for the senses of smell,
touch, or taste. Sight and hearing, moreover, must be artificially enhanced even
for survival.
In such an environment, concepts rule—that is, the context is so overwhelming
and powerful that doctrine must take a back seat. Take, for example, the horizon.
The horizon is a concept. You can’t get there from here or anywhere else. But ad-
versaries can place themselves just
beyond the horizon, and without
overhead assets an at-sea com-
mander will not know they are
there. Moreover, the environment
is truly three-dimensional, insofar as it has dimensionality in depth as well as
in height.
Concepts are more important to a naval strategist than doctrine is. This is
because concepts and doctrine tend to be enemies. Concepts are undefined, not
clearly bounded, changing and changeable; doctrine is defined, bounded,
difficult to change, and relatively inflexible. Admiral Chester Nimitz had it just
right: he considered doctrine as a reminder, sort of a checklist to ensure nothing
is forgotten or overlooked.5
The at-sea environment is very different from where people live. All the
familiar things—family, school, community, friends—are radically different
from what they are at “home.” There are no constant reminders of home.
Neither trees, houses, river banks, highways, mountains, nor malls are in
evidence.
In such an environment, the most difficult problem facing a commander is
finding the adversary. The corollary, of course, is to take actions so that the
adversary cannot find you. This is a two-sided question of establishing and
denying sanctuary, and it persists for twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.
When terrain is part of the environment, it influences the ability to find
seaborne adversaries. This explains the operational importance of geographic
choke points and ports. Darkness and weather are environmental factors to be
taken into consideration as well.
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The corollary to the importance of findability is also pivotal for maritime
forces: that they take positive actions to prevent their being found by an
adversary. If ships or submarines can be found on vast ocean tracts or under the
deepest oceans, they become vulnerable. If they are vulnerable, the possibility of
their being sunk looms real, and their prospective value comes into question, for
they cannot be reconstituted.
The importance of the overall context of the conflict and of understanding
the adversary’s strategy can be understood when one considers the great debate
that accompanied the inclusion of attacks on Soviet ballistic missile submarines
in the 1980s maritime strategy. This was controversial enough to cause Barry
Posen to write, “We now live in the worst of all possible worlds.”6
What Posen and others had argued was that attacking Soviet ballistic missile
submarines would cause them to “use them or lose them” and that therefore
doing so was of little strategic value and could cause a catastrophic holocaust.
But the critics could not answer why the Soviets would protect the submarines if
they would use them or lose them, instead harping on their slogan while refusing
to address the context, which was crucial to understanding the strategic
interaction.7
So strongly influencing to maritime strategy is the question of context that
one of Napoleon’s maxims asserts: “A general commanding an army and an
admiral commanding a fleet need different qualities. The qualities necessary to
command an army are born in one; but those necessary to command a fleet are
acquired only by experience.”8
SYSTEMS APPROACH
Those proficient in maritime warfare think in systems terms. Land warfare ex-
perts think in terms of units. When an army officer briefs, the first thing he dis-
plays is an organizational chart. He lives and dies by organizational charts, for a
commander must know where his air defenses and field kitchens are and what
unit is supplying his MPs, for example. When the admiral arrives on the scene,
he has no thoughts at all of where these things are or who is supplying them. He
is thinking in terms of air defense systems, antisubmarine systems, of mine war-
fare, amphibious, logistics, and strike systems. It is not accidental that network-
centric warfare originated in the Navy and that a naval officer wrote a book
about a “system of systems.”9 Naval officers are entirely comfortable with elec-
tronic systems and networks. Indeed, the first radar-directed dogfight took place
at sea in February 1942, and the Naval Tactical Data System, with its intership
and aircraft links, went to sea over forty years ago.10 As Wayne Hughes noted,
“All navies are concerned with the movement and delivery of goods and services
rather than with ‘the purchase of real estate.’ Thus, a navy is in the links, not the
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nodes business.”11 Commenting on naval operations in World War II, Fleet Ad-
miral William F. Halsey is reported to have said, “A fleet is like a hand of cards at
poker or bridge. You don’t see it as aces and kings and deuces. You see it as a
hand, a unit. You see a fleet as a unit, not carriers, battleships and destroyers. You
don’t play individual cards, you play the hand.”12 Of course, Metcalf ’s Law—to
the effect that the power of a network increases as the square of the number of
nodes—gives additional support to the notion that numbers really matter in sea
warfare.
This mode of thought begins in elementary naval training and education,
and it continues throughout a naval career. It encourages approaching
questions—including strategies—from a holistic, systematic point of view.
If it is correct that naval thinking is systems based, it would seem axiomatic
that navies would be great advocates of jointness—linking up with
complementary and supplementary sources of information and action. Yet the
Navy has traditionally been cool to jointness, viewing it essentially as a one-way
street: the Navy knows full well what it can do for the other services, but it is
skeptical of what they can do for it. In an era of networking, when assets—and
especially information—can be accessed and put to advantage quickly and
easily, the Navy must and will be more forthcoming with respect to jointness.
EXPEDITIONARY
The third aspect of Navy strategic culture is that it is very strongly expeditionary.
That means naval forces are not garrison forces but are forward deployed and
ready for offensive action at all times. It means fully mobile, not static, forces.
Maneuver, correctly understood as movement relative to an adversary, is not
an option for naval forces but a way of life. The Navy is always maneuvering; it is
maneuver that makes offense, defense, and logistical support effective.
Maneuver accomplishes nothing on its own: it enables the other functions. As
Muhammad Ali said, “Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.” It is not the float but
the sting that matters.
From the early 1960s until the adoption of the Cold War maritime strategy of
the 1980s, the Navy was relegated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to a
role of defensive sea control. The Navy chafed at this, considering it derisively as
“hauling ash and trash.” When the Maritime Strategy, a sharp break from a
defensive sea control posture, was presented at the Army War College in 1983, an
irate member of the audience suggested that the Navy was not interested in
protecting the vital sea lanes that carry the reinforcement and resupply convoys
to Europe in case of war, that all the Navy was seeking was support for its
expensive big-deck carrier programs while impoverishing the Army. The
presenter responded, “The Army is not defending Texas. It’s in Germany.” The
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point registered was that the Navy, by pinning down Soviet submarines north of
the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap and by filtering out the Soviet
naval aviation threat, was providing protection for the sea lanes in the same way
the Army was defending Texas—that is, by operating in forward areas.
At sea, it is important to “attack effectively first,” as Wayne Hughes has also
wisely counseled.13 It is also vital that a navy with global reach have the capability
to project power ashore with guns, missiles, or aircraft, or employ Marines in
operational maneuver from the sea. All these entail offensive capability to
achieve offensive objectives.
Forward deploying means interaction with allied navies, and the Navy has
always worked assiduously at initiating and fostering such links. From the
biennial International Seapower Symposium series first convened in 1969 to the
establishment at the Naval War College of the Naval Command College in 1956
and the Naval Staff College in 1972, to the conduct of navy-to-navy staff talks
with many navies for nearly thirty years, to the suggestion by the Chief of Naval
Operations of a thousand-ship navy in 2005, the Navy has been in the forefront
of international cooperation for the freedom of the seas and for the ability to use
the seas in securing national interests. Forward presence also means that naval
forces, unlike those of the other services, can be positioned and configured in a
way that leaves to the adversary the decision to break the peace. That is, others
must take U.S. and allied naval units on the scene into account before they act in
ways contrary to American interests.
ADAPTABILITY
The fourth cultural aspect of interest is adaptability. Warfare has been likened to
a complex adaptive system, and a major aspect of strategy is anticipation. An ef-
fective strategy must anticipate actions of a thinking adversary, and then it must
be sufficiently adaptive to prevent or neutralize the adversary’s counterefforts.
To the extent that anticipation is lacking or that one is surprised, the greater will
be the need for adaptability. Ways (strategies) exhibit various degrees of adapt-
ability. Means (forces), on the other hand, exhibit various degrees of flexibility.
Flexibility should also be a conscious by-product of training and education.14 A
good strategy is supported by flexible forces and flexible frames of mind, provid-
ing it as many dimensions of adaptability as possible. Adaptability is built into
the strategy and must be a prime consideration for the preparation of plans and
of the commander’s intent.
Adaptability, characterized by individual initiative and freedom of action, has
long been a strength of the Navy. As Victor Davis Hanson has observed, “At
critical stages during the planning, fighting, and aftermath of the battle [of
Midway], American military personnel at all ranks were unusually innovative,
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even eccentric, and always unpredictable. Most were unafraid to take the
initiative to craft policy when orders from superiors were either vague or
nonexistent—in a fashion completely antithetical to the protocols of operations
in the imperial fleet, which in turn mirrored much of the prevailing values and
attitudes inherent in Japanese society.”15 Moreover, “Individualism, unlike
consensual government and constitutional recognition of political freedom, is a
cultural, rather than political, entity.”16
The need for adaptability in the battle space helps to explain the Navy’s
coolness to the prescriptive nature of written doctrine. Doctrine, as it is
understood in the joint arena, “connects the dots.” But then it goes a step farther
and says: “See the lines connecting the dots? You must color inside the lines.”17
This runs directly counter to the Navy’s need for adaptability at the lowest levels
of command. As Colin Gray has written, “If we fail the adaptability test, we are
begging to be caught out by the diversity and complexity of future warfare.”18
UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
Much has been written about uncertainty and risk. Clausewitz’s categorization
of fog and friction in warfare has a long audit trail.19 The sources of uncertainty
stem from information deficiencies; the misalignment of ends, ways, and means;
the nonlinearity of combat-related effects, resulting in unanticipated or unin-
tended consequences; and external constraints on the application of military
force.20 Risks arise from, and are measured by, the magnitude of these uncertain-
ties. Uncertainty and risk are always present and unavoidable. Still, as has been
known from the time of the ancient Greeks, “He who does not expect the unex-
pected cannot detect it.”21
A successful strategy should discuss uncertainty and risk and describe how
the strategy has been designed to cope with these, so that it does not result in the
worst of all possible outcomes for a strategy—catastrophic failure. If a strategy
fails, it should be designed to fail gracefully and then recover. Analysis and
detailing of uncertainty and risk inherent in the strategy and in the context in
which it will be applied are key. Long ago, Louis Pasteur pointed out that “chance
favors the prepared mind.”22
Uncertainties are those things for which assumptions must be made in the
crafting of a strategy. Typically they encompass, for example, warning and
decision times; the expected length of an engagement, campaign, or conflict;
whether certain classes or types of weapons will be employed; the relevance and
effectiveness of training; the sturdiness of the morale of the force; whether
systems will perform up to operational expectations; and the effects of
operational or technological surprise. All these and more must be considered
and accounted for in the preparation and adoption of a strategy.
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SALTWATER IN THEIR VEINS
When crafting a strategy, one must proceed with due appreciation for the central
cultural tenets of those who will plan and execute. At the top of the list, affecting
all other considerations, is the matter of context. The maritime strategy of the
1980s, prepared in the context of a global war with the Soviet Union, is now ob-
solete. There is no single driving context against which to write a maritime strat-
egy for the future.
Indeed, the current context of conflict will require U.S. military forces to:
• Deploy somewhere they perhaps have never been
• Fight an adversary they have never fought
• Use weapons and equipment that might have never been used in combat,
often in ways that were never intended
• Execute their orders regardless of weather or visibility
• Continue to perform in the horrific presence of death or wounding of
friendly fighters as well as adversaries
• Operate on the basis of incomplete, untimely, and perhaps incorrect
information
• Pursue sometimes vague, conflicting, or incomprehensible objectives
• Conduct combat operations under the unblinking eye of the television
camera and the constant scrutiny of the press
• Tolerate long separations from family and loved ones
• Endure lukewarm public support, sometimes open hostility, from the
home front
• Absorb minimum casualties from an adversary that might fight in
unconventional, unanticipated, or illegitimate ways; that might be under
the influence of performance-enhancing drugs; or that may employ
nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons
• Achieve their objectives (i.e., win) quickly
• Inflict minimum casualties on the adversary
• Cause minimal destruction to property and the environment and minimal
casualties to noncombatants, provide assistance to injured combatants and
noncombatants, and be prepared to restore that which has been damaged
• Trigger no (or only benign) unintended consequences
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—and all the while hobbled by rules (doctrine, international law, principles of
war, rules of engagement) formulated in and for a radically different context.
This will mean that one might have to prepare several strategies to meet
different requirements, or a multitiered strategy. How this will be approached is
a function of how the crafters of the strategy view the relationship between naval
strategy and the national military strategy. If the national military strategy is
holistic enough to deal with a variety of contexts, it is possible that a single
maritime strategy could support it. To the extent that the national military
strategy and national guidance is ambiguous or insufficient to make a clear
delineation as to how to proceed, the maritime strategy will itself necessarily
contain areas that are more abstract than would otherwise be desirable.
The preparers of the strategy, mindful of both the force and value of the
cultural factors set forth above—the primacy of context in a systems-based,
expeditionary, adaptable approach, with a clear focus on uncertainties and
risks—must also concern
themselves with the forces
that would be necessary to
execute the strategy. This
concern, however, should be
set aside during the preparation of the strategy, which should not be subject to
explicit force size or fiscal constraints. That is, one should prepare an ideal
maritime strategy that is fully complementary to the national military strategy,
that describes how naval forces can make a strategic difference. Only after that
has been accomplished should one try to determine if forces are or will be
available that can fulfill the requirements with acceptable levels of risk. If the
judgment is that they will not, one must either seek more capable forces, modify
the strategy, or be prepared to accept greater levels of risk. This is a never-ending
process, but it must be undertaken if naval forces are to be empowered to exert
maximum strategic leverage.
The preparers of the strategy should be practitioners—Navy and Marine
Corps officers with saltwater in their veins and relevant education. This is
important, for as Edward Luttwak has written, “To evoke the intense loyalty
without which combat is impossible, armed forces must be the proud keepers of
exclusive traditions and reassuring continuities.”23 To this end, those naval
authors should be provided a set of precepts against which to prepare the
strategy. These precepts would include the relevant context, framework, and
cultural signposts for what is to be included. It is to the generation of a set of
precepts, as comprehensive as possible, that the New Maritime Strategy Process
launched by the Chief of Naval Operations should be dedicated.
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NOTE S
An abbreviated version of this article was pre-
sented to a Center for Naval Analyses confer-
ence, “The Future of Maritime Strategy,” on
25 October 2006.
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